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Abstract: Threshold schemes have been used to protect secrets by distributing shares to 
participants. To protect two secrets, we can use two separate traditional schemes, say, a (t1, n1) 
scheme and a (t2, n2) scheme. If there are u (≤min(t1, t2) ) participants involved in both 
schemes, each of these u participants must keep two different shares. This paper proposes a 
method that allows each common participant to keep only one share. Our method constructs 
two polynomials with u common crossover points. We give theoretical details and two 
demonstrative examples. This algorithm can also handle the collaboration between more than 
two schemes. 
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1     Introduction 
To protect a secret, such as an encryption key, threshold scheme (also called secret sharing) 
has been proposed [3, 6, 5] to divide the secret into shares and the shares can be distributed to 
participants. When two or more secrets need to be protected, several separate schemes can be 
employed. If a participant is involved in two or more schemes, he must keep multiple shares. 
Consider a case with a (3, 5) scheme and a (4, 6) scheme, and there are two common 
participants. This is similar to the situation where two banks want to collaborate. Each bank 
has a safe cabinet. The first bank has a group of five VPs responsible for its cabinet. Any 
                                                          
* Corresponding author. Tel.:+86-10-62782930. 
E-mail address: daoshun@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn  (Daoshun Wang). 
 2 / 14 
 
three of the five can open it. The second bank has a group of six VPs handling their cabinet. 
Any four of the six can open it. These two VP groups overlap by two. In other words, two 
VPs are working for both banks and are involved with both cabinets. This phenomenon has 
become more commonplace in today's co-operation practice between organizations. With the 
traditional threshold schemes, each common VP must carry two keys. In the digital case, each 
common participant must keep two shares, along with their corresponding indices. If a 
participant is involved with a large number of secrets, he needs to keep many shares which 
can be a burden. Note that the dealers of the two threshold schemes may not be the same 
person. One dealer may not know the secret of the other dealer. Therefore, we basically still 
have two separate schemes but they are to be designed in a way that facilitates collaboration 
in terms of common participants. 
 
In this paper, we propose a method for constructing two (or more) threshold schemes 
allowing each common participant to keep only one share. Suppose that we have a 
),( 11 nt scheme and a ),( 22 nt  scheme with 21 ttu  ( not 21 ttu  ) common participants. 
Using Shamir's polynomial approach [6], the first curve is decided arbitrarily as long as p is 
chosen with both schemes in mind. From the common crossover points, the second curve can 
be easily constructed. 
 
The detailed construction method for a simple two-scheme case is presented in Section 2. 
Section 3 discusses cases with more than two schemes. Section 4 gives conclusions. Two 
numerical examples are shown in Appendix. 
 
2   A Simple Case with Two Secrets 
2.1 Curve Construction  
To protect two secrets ( 0,1a  and 0,2a ) using polynomial interpolation [1] proposed by Shamir 
[6], a 11,( nt ) scheme and a ),( 22 nt  scheme are used, where  
Znnaa 210,20,1 ,,, . Without 
loss of generality, let  21 tt   and suppose there are 1tu  common participants. If 21 ttu   
and the two secrets are different numbers, the traditional threshold schemes must be used and 
each common participant must keep two shares. If the three values ( u , 1t  and  2t ) are not all 
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equal, i.e., either 1tu   or 21 tt  , the proposed construction algorithm below can guarantee 
that each common participant keeps only one share. 
 
To begin with, the dealers agree on a large prime number p with )1,1,,(max 210,20,1  nnaap . 
Let pZ  
represent the field of integers modulo p . Choose pi Za 1,1 , pi Za 2,2 , where 
1,0 11  ti  ,  1,,0 22  ti  . The first polynomial is  
    )(mod)( 11,1
2
2,11,10,11
1
1
pxaxaxaaxf
t
t

                                                         (1)  
Let   )(1,1 ifD i   , where 11 ni   , denote the evaluation of )(1 if  over pZ . Dealer 1 chooses 
any  u  points from the 1n  points ),(,),,1( 1,111,1 nDnD   in the 2D plane. Suppose that he picked 
))(,(,)),2(,2()),1(,1( 111 ufuff   and passed on to Dealer 2.  
Then Dealer 2 constructs )(2 xf  starting from ),0( 0,2a . He randomly picks 12 ut  points 
))1(,1(,)),1(,1( 2222  tftufu  . One way to do it is to compute any arbitrary polynomial of 
degree 12 t .  
Some special cases may need attention.  When 21 tt  , the polynomial curves )(1 xf  and )(2 xf  
are of the same degree. As long as the constant terms (the secrets they are protecting) are 
different, i.e., 0,20,1 aa  , Dealer 2 can proceed as usual. Example 2 demonstrates this situation 
in Appendix. When 21 tt   and 0,20,1 aa  , Dealer 2 should avoid a “conflict”, i.e., curves 
)(1 xf  and )(2 xf  could end up to be identical to each other.  
Since each coefficient can take  p  possible values, the probability that )(2 xf  is identical to 
)(1 xf  is )/(1
12 utp  which is very close to zero. In other words, the set 
{ ))1(,1(,)),1(,1( 2222  tftufu  } that Dealer 2 selected is almost certainly different from the 
set of Dealer 1: )}.,(,),,1{( 1,111,1 nu DnDu  At least one point would be different, i.e., 
 )(,))(,( 12 ifiifi  . Therefore, )(2 xf  being identical to )(1 xf  is highly unlikely. To 
completely avoid this extremely rare conflict, Dealer 2 could send a subset of his points to 
Dealer 1. If this subset happens to be the same as Dealer 1's points, Dealer 1 can warn Dealer 
2 about a possible conflict. He doesn't need to know the entire set of Dealer 2. In application, 
choosing a big enough value for p would solve this problem quite sufficiently. 
So far, Dealer 2 has 2t  points:  
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),0( 0,2a , ))(,(,)),1(,1( 11 ufuf  , ))1(,1(,)),1(,1( 2222  tftufu  .For convenience, let's call these 
points )1,0())(,( 2  tiii   and apply them to the interpolation polynomial in the Lagrange 
form  
          
)(mod
)(
)(
)()(
1
1
1
0
2
22
p
xx
xx
xxf
t
jl
l lj
l
t
j
j 







  .                                                    (2) 
The result polynomial )(2 xf  of degree 12 t  will take the following form: 
)(mod)(
1
1,2
2
2,21,20,22
2
2
pxaxaxaaxf
t
t

                                           (3) 
A numerical example is given in Appendix to demonstrate the above procedure. 
 
In Equation (3), )(2 xf  is formed by an addition of 2t  polynomials of degree 12 t , each result 
coefficient is a product of 2t coefficients, and each coefficient takes value in the range of 
{ 1,,0 p }. When every value in the range is equally likely, the probability of 
)(mod01,2 2 pa t   is 1/p. When )(mod01,2 2 pa t   happens, Dealer 2 should re-select his points so 
that )(mod0)(mod1,2 2 ppa t  . 
 
2.2  Share Distribution 
Dealer 1 distributes )(1 ifDi   to participants i, where 11 ni  . Note that the evaluation of 
)(1 if  in Equation (1) is done over pZ .  
Dealer 2 obtains 2n  values { 22 1),(' njjfD j  } by evaluating )(2 jf  over pz . He eliminated 
u values in { jD' } that are identical to those in { iD }, then distribute the remaining to the 
un 2 participants. 
 
2.3  Secret Reconstruction： 
The reconstruction process (to reveal the secret) is exactly the same as that in Shamir's 
scheme [6]. 
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Given any subset of  1t  of the 1n  values 11 ,, nDD  , we can find the coefficients of )(1 xf  by 
interpolation [1,4], and then evaluate  
       )(mod
)(
)()1()0(
11
1
11
1
1 p
xx
x
xfD
t
jl
l lj
l
t
j
j
t 




  , where ),,2,1(, 1nxx lj  .  
to reveal the first secret. 
 
Given any subset of  2t  of the 2n  values 2,,1 nDD   , we can find the coefficients of  )(2 xf  by 
interpolation ([4]), and then evaluate  
        )(mod
)(
)()1()0(
22
2
11
1
2 p
xx
x
xfD
t
jl
l lj
l
t
j
j
t 




  , where  ),,2,1(, 2nxx lj  ) . 
to reveal the second secret. 
 
Knowing only 11 t  (resp. 12 t ) values, on the other hand, does not suffice in order to 
discover D  (resp. D ). 
 
2.4 Parameter Consideration： 
The above algorithm can not be used when 21 ttu  . If such a situation exists and the two 
secrets are different, traditional threshold schemes must be employed. Having 21 ttu   is not 
desirable from the security point of view, since the u common participants, possibly from 
outside, can access the secret without the knowledge of non-common (pure local) participants. 
It is safer that more than u participants are always required in the reconstruction of the secret, 
i.e., 1tu   and 2tu  .  
 
3 Cases with More Than Two Secrets 
When there are )2( ss  secrets to be protected, multiple threshold schemes ( ),( 11 nt  , ),( 22 nt ，
...， ),( ss nt ) can be used . If there are u common participants, we can construct s 
polynomials )(1 xf , )(),...,(2 xfxf s with u common crossover points. Here, the polynomials are 
)(mod)(
1
1,1
2
2,11,10,11
1
1
pxaxaxaaxf
t
t

   
)(mod)(
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1,2
2
2,21,20,22
2
2
pxaxaxaaxf
t
t

   
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)(mod)(
1
1,3
2
2,31,30,33
3
3
pxaxaxaaxf
t
t

   
  
)(mod)(
1
1,
2
2,1,0, pxaxaxaaxf
s
s
t
tsssss

 
 
 
3.1 Curve Construction  
Dealer 1 is the first dealer to act and he uses )(1 xf  to protect Secret 1 ( 0,1a ). He obtains 1n  
points )(,(,)),1(,1( 1111 nfnf  in the 2D plane. He can choose any u points among them. For 
convenience, he picks the first u points, i.e.,  ))(,(,)),2(,2()),1(,1( 111 ufuff   for the common 
crossover points of all polynomials. 
 
For sj ,,2  , Dealer  j  uses a polynomial )(xf j of degree 1jt  with 0,ja  being Secret j. With 
),0( 0,ja  as the original point and u common crossover points, he can construct )(xf j .  
 
For example, when j = 2, Dealer 2 can obtain 12 ut  points by computing any polynomial 
)(2 xf  of degree 12 t  or randomly chooses 12 ut  points.  As long as that not all these 
12 ut  points come from { ))(,(,)),1(,1( 1111 nfnufu  }, i.e., at least there is one i with 
 )(,))(,( 12 ifiifi  , 2)1( tiu  , )(2 xf  would not be identical to )(1 if . The probability that 
the constant terms are the same between the two polynomials is 1/p. Since the  12 ut  
coefficients are random chosen from p integers, the probability of two polynomials being 
identical is only )/(1 2 utp  . As we mentioned in Sec.2,1, choosing a large enough p should 
avoid this extremely rare conflict.  
 
Dealer j with sj 2  acts similarly.  Dealer s can obtain 1uts  points by computing any 
polynomial )(xfs  of degree  1st  or randomly chooses 1uts  points. Not all these 1uts  
points should come from the set )}(,(,)),1(,1{( 1111 nfnufu  . Namely, at least there is one i with 
 )(,))(,( 1 ifiifi s  , stiu  )1( . As we discussed in Section 2.1, the probability of two 
polynomials constructed by different dealers end up identical to each other (a conflict) is very 
small, especially when the p value is sufficiently large. If the dealers decide to completely 
avoid this highly unlikely conflict, they could send each other a subset of their points and warn 
each other if the subsets are identical. 
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In the construction process, if )(mod0)(mod1, ppa jti  ， sjsi ,,2,,,2   , we need to change 
))(,(,)),1(,1( iiii tftufu   points ， si ,,2   so that  )( m o d0)( m o d1, ppa jti  , 
si ,,2  sj ,,2,   in order to make sure that )(mod)2,,1,2,,2(0, ptujsia sti j   . 
 
3.2 Some Discussions 
It is obvious that the security of the proposed scheme is the same as the traditional scheme [6]. 
That is, fewer than st  of the sn  shares cannot reveal any information about the secret, where 
,1s . The computation complexity of the recovery secret proposed schemes is )log( 2 kkO  
[1], which is the same as the one of Shamir’s scheme in [6].  For more analysis on threshold 
scheme see [2, 7]. 
The proposed algorithm can be modified to handle more complex situations where the 
collaborations between the schemes are of a different nature. For example, there are five 
dealers responsible for five secrets with five schemes, and the schemes are of (2, 3), (3, 5), (4, 
6), (5, 7) and (7, 9). The (2, 3) scheme and the (3, 5) scheme have 2 common participants. The 
(4, 6) scheme, the (5, 7) scheme and the (7, 9) scheme have 4 common participants. 
The dealers may or may be the same person, and they may or may not know each other's 
secrets. As long as they pass u shares to the common participants, the curves they construct 
would be valid.  Another point of notice is that the dealers and participants in the proposed 
schemes, who are similar to those of Shamir’s scheme, are honest. 
 
4.  Conclusions: 
This paper proposes an effective collaboration mechanism for two or more threshold schemes 
to insure that each common participant keeps only one share. They achieve this by 
constructing polynomials with a number of common crossover points. When the polynomials 
are sequenced in an increasing order of their degree, the construction is always successful. 
When the co-operation between organizations becomes more popular and common 
participants are involved in multiple secrets, the proposed method can reduce the storage 
requirement and increase the security and convenience. 
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Appendix: Two Numerical Examples 
Example 1: collaboration between a (3, 5) scheme and a (4, 6) scheme. 
Suppose there are two secrets (integers 1 and 3) that could be protected by two dealers, 
separately, with two traditional threshold schemes: one (3, 5) scheme and one (4, 6) scheme. 
Let's the five participants involved with the first secret form Group 1, and let's the six 
participants for the second secret form Group 2. These two groups overlap by two. That is, 
each one of these two common participants must keep two shares. For easy lookup, we list the 
related parameters here: 
),5,3(),( 11 nt ),6,4(),( 22 nt ,2u ,10,1 a  30,2 a . 
Part 1 of Example 1: Curve Construction 
Step 1: Dealer 1 constructs a (3, 5) threshold scheme for Secret 1 (integer 1).  
 
Using our construction method, the dealers agree on a large prime number p as 
7)16,15,3,1max( p .  
Then he defines the first curve with 31,1 a  and 22,1 a , that is 
    )(mod231)(mod)( 211,11,10,11
1
1
pxxpxaxaaxf
t
t 

 , 
where x=0, 1, 2, … , 6. 
When x takes values 0, 1, … , 5, this curve produces six points:  
(0, 1)0(1 f ), (1, 6)1(1 f ), (2, 1)2(1 f ), (3, 0)3(1 f ), (4, 3)4(1 f ), (5, 3)5(1 f ). 
From the above six points, he picks up two points at random, say, (1, 6) and (2, 1), for the two 
common participants. These two points are handed over to Dealer 2. 
Step 2: Dealer 2 constructs a (4, 6) threshold scheme for Secret 2 (integer 3). 
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With 30,2 a , Dealer 2 already has three points: (0, 3), (1, 6), and (2, 1). To construct a 
polynomial of degree 312 t , he needs one more point. He chooses (3, y). The value of y 
can be arbitrary, i.e., he picks the point )3)3(,3(( 2 f .  
Using Lagrange interpolation[1,4] 
)(mod
)(
)(
)()(
1
1
1
0
2
22
p
xx
xx
xxf
t
jl
l lj
l
t
j
j 







 
 
Dealer 2 substitutes jx values with 0, 1, 2 and 3, the 2t  addition terms are 
)7(mod3533
6
)3)(2)(1(3
)30)(20)(10(
)3)(2)(1(
3 23 





 xxx
xxxxxx
, 
)7(mod463
2
)3)(2)(0(6
)31)(21)(01(
)3)(2)(0(
6 23 xxx
xxxxxx





 , 
)7(mod223
2
)3)(1)(0(
)32)(12)(02(
)3)(1)(0(
1 23 xxx
xxxxxx






 , 
6
)2)(1)(0(3
)23)(13)(03(
)2)(1)(0(
3





xxxxxx
= )7(mod24 23 xxx  .  
Therefore, Dealer 2 obtains 
)(2 xf )7(mod3566
23  xxx , where x = 0, 1, 2, … , 6. 
Figure 1 shows the cross points between two curves, )(1 xf  and )(2 xf , in the 2D space. 
Because of the use of modular arithmetic, the curves are periodic. 
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  Figure 1. The red curve shows the interpolation polynomial )(1 xf  and the blue curve shows 
)(2 xf . 
Note that 2f is formed by an addition of 2t  polynomials of degree 12 t , each result 
coefficient is a product of 2t coefficients, and each coefficient takes value in the range of 
{ 1,...,0 p }. When every value in the range is equally likely, the probability of 
)(mod01,2 2 pa t   is 1/p. In this particular example, this undesirable situation did not occur. 
The following table lists different result polynomials corresponding to various y values for 
))3(,3( 2 yf  . 
Table 1: The effect of the selection of  }17,,0{)3(    in the form of )(2 xf  
))3(,3(               )(2 xf  
)0,3(  )7(mod3442
23  xxx  
)1,3(    )7(mod320
23  xxx  
)2,3(  )7(mod3030
23  xxx  
)3,3(  )7(mod3566
23  xxx  
)4,3(  )7(mod3325
23  xxx  
)5,3(  )7(mod354
23  xxx  
)6,3(  )7(mod363
23  xxx  
 
It can be seen that each coefficient indeed takes all values of the range with proximately 
equality frequency, except the constant term. From Table 1, while )3( =2, dealer 2 
obtains )(2 xf = )7(mod3030
23  xxx . To avoid a polynomial with highest term being zero, 
he adds a checking action in the construction phase: when 01, tia , try again and pick a 
different curve. 
      
Part 2 of Example 1: Share Distribution 
 
Using 7mod)132()( 21  xxxf , 5,,2,1,0 x , Dealer 1 computes )(1 ifDi   to obtain five 
points ).3,5(),3,4(),0,3(),1,2(),6,1( , and distribute to the five participants. 
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Using )7(mod3566)( 232  xxxxf , 6,,2,1,0 x , Dealer 2 computes   )(2 jfD j   to obtain 
six points ),3,3(),1,2(),6,1(  and distributes them to the six participants. The first two participants 
are common between the groups, and each of them needs to keep only one share. 
 
Part 3 of Example 1: Secret Reconstruction. 
The reconstruction process is exactly the same as that in Shamir's traditional scheme [6]. 
For Secret 1 protected by the (3, 5) scheme, given any set of  1t  of these 1n  values ( 11 ,, nDD  ), 
we can find the coefficients of )(1 xf  by interpolation [1, 4], and then evaluate     
)(mod
)(
)()1()0(
11
1
11
1
1 p
xx
x
xfD
t
jl
l lj
l
t
j
j
t 




  , where },,2,1{, 1nxx lj  .                                   (1) 
Case 1: Both common participants are involved ( )1,2(),6,1( ) plus another participant, one from 
{ )3,5(),3,4(),0,3( }. Assume that it is )0,3( . By (1), we obtain the secret as follows          
)0(1fD  1)7(mod))
)23()13(
21
0
)32()12(
31
1
)31()21(
32
6()1(( 2 








  
Case 2:  Suppose that one common participant (e.g., (2, 1)) works with two non-common 
participants (e.g., (4, 3) and (5, 3). Using Equation (1), we achieve   
 
       1)7(mod))
)45()25(
42
3
)54)(24(
52
3
)52)(42(
54
1()1(()0( 21 








 fD  
Case 3:  Without any common participants, the three non-common participants have three 
points (3, 0), (4, 3) and (5, 3). We can get  
1)7(mod))
)45()35(
43
3
)54()34(
53
3
)53()43(
54
0()1(()0( 21 








 fD  
For Secret 2 protected by the (4, 6) scheme, given any subset of  2t  of these 1n  values 
2
,,1 nDD   , we can find the coefficients of )(2 xf  by interpolation [1,4].     
Case 1: When the two common participants ((1, 6), (2, 1)) and two others (e.g., (4, 6) and (6, 
5)) work together, they can obtain the secret by 
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Case 2: When one common participant (e.g., (1, 6)) works with three non-common 
participants (e.g., (4, 6), (5, 4) and (6, 5)), they can get 
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Case 3:  Without any common participants, the four non-common participants hold the four 
points (3,3),(4,6) ,(5,4)  and (6,5). Thus they can compute 
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Example 2: collaboration between two (3, 5) schemes. 
Suppose there are two secrets (integers 1 and 3) that could be protected by two dealers, 
separately, with two traditional threshold (3, 5) schemes. The first group of five participants 
involved with the first secret and the second group of five overlap by two. That is, each one of 
these two common participants must keep two shares. For easy lookup, we list the related 
parameters here: 
),5,3(),( 11 nt ),5,3(),( 22 nt ,2u ,10,1 a  30,2 a . 
The curve construction phase for Example 2: 
Step 1: (is the same as the Step1 of Example 1) 
Dealer 1 defines the first curve )7(mod231)( 21 xxxf  , where x=0, 1, 2, … , 6. 
When x takes values 0, 1, …, 5, this curve produces six points:  
(0, 1)0(1 f ), (1, 6)1(1 f ), (2, 1)2(1 f ), (3, 0)3(1 f ), (4, 3)4(1 f ), (5, 3)5(1 f ). 
From the above six points, he picks up two points at random, say, (1, 6) and (2, 1), for the two 
common participants. These two points are handed over to Dealer 2. 
Step 2: Dealer 2 constructs a (3, 5) threshold scheme for Secret 2 (integer 3). 
 
With 30,2 a , Dealer 2 already has three points: (0, 3), and (1, 6). To construct a polynomial 
of degree 212 t , he needs one more point..  
Using Lagrange interpolation 
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Dealer 2 substitutes jx values with 0, 1, and 2, the 2t  addition terms are 
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Therefore, Dealer 2 obtains 
                   )(2 xf )7(mod33
2 x , where x = 0, 1, 2, … , 6. 
Recall that Dealer 1’s curve is 
)7(mod231)( 21 xxxf  . 
These two curves are shown in the following figure 2. The red curve shows the interpolation 
polynomial )(1 xf  and the blue curve shows )(2 xf . 
 
 
Figure 2. The curves for Example 2. 
